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Korean Protestant Conservatives began political activities against the government
when the Roh Moo Hyun administration took office. Conservative Protestants
have long been obedient to the government and kept silence on socio-political
issues since the foundation of the Republic of Korea. Those politically active
conservative Protestants were called the Christian Right. Their sudden political
activism came from a sense of crisis they felt about the Kim Dae Jung and Roh
Moo Ryun governments’ progressive policies. It arose in a “power vacuum” that
even though the progressive governments took political power, the “Cold War
structures” still dominated many sections of Korean society. The Christian Right,
just like the ideological right, was formed due to a sense of ideological crisis. It
thought that the Kim and Roh administrations were pushing Korea, the rightist
republic as it believed, into a crisis by adapting leftist policy measures. Their key
values were pro-Americanism and anti-communism. Just like American Religious
Right, their anti-communism was connected to Manichaean dualism, fundamentalism,
and a belief in the providential role of the United States in fight against evil. However,
unlike the American counterpart, the Korean Christian Right paid little attention to
ethical issues, while making issue of ideological and socio-political matters only.The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
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Die koreanischen konservativen Protestanten fingen an, ihre regierungsfeindliche
politische Haltung gegen die Regierung von Roh Moo Hyun einzunehmen. Seit der
Staatsgründung haben die konservativen Protestanten stets eine friedliche Haltung
gegenüber der Regierung eingenommen und verhielten sich zu den soziopolitischen
Problemen eher zurückhaltend. Aber plötzlich zeigten die sogenannten „christlichen
Konservativen“ ihre regierungsfeindliche Haltung gegenüber der Roh Regierung;
denn sie beurteilten die fortschrittliche Politik der Regierung von Kim Dae Jung und
Roh Moo Hyun als eine Gefahr. Als die „Linken“ die Macht übernommen hatten, war
die koreanische Gesellschaft immer noch im „System des Kalten Krieges“ gefangen
und ein „Machtvakuum“ war dadurch entstanden. Die rechtsradikalen Christen sind -
wie auch alle andere ideologische Rechtsradikalen - durch die ideologische Krise
entstanden. Sie waren der Meinung, dass die Kim Dae Jung und Roh Moo Hyuns
Regierung durch ihre „Pro-Nord Korea“ und „Linken“ Politik die koreanische Republik
in die Krise stürzte. Ihre wesentlichen Werte waren Proamerikanismus und
Antikommunismus. Ähnlich wie bei amerikanischen religiösen Konservativen hatte
ihre antikommunistische Haltung eine Verbindung zum manichäischen Dualismus,
Fundamentalismus und zu dem Glauben in der zugedachten Rolle der Vereinigten
Staaten im Kampf gegen das Böse. Jedoch zeigten die koreanischen christlichen
Konservativen - im Gegensatz zu amerikanischen christlichen Konservativen - nur ihr
ideologisches bzw. politisch-wirtschaftliches Interesse, ohne auf die ethische
Problematik einzugehen.
Keywords: Korean Convervative Protestants, Anti-Communism, Pro-Americanism, The
Korean Christian Right, The American Religious Right, Fundamentalism, Manichaeism,
Common-Sense RealismIntroduction
On the March First Independence Movement Day in 2004, a mass meeting was con-
vened in the Seoul City Hall Square. It was “The Independence Movement Day
National Meeting to Eradicate the Pro-North Korea Leftists and Corruption” organized
by “The National Council for Anti-Nuclear, Anti-Kim Jong-Il National Sovereignty Pro-
tection.” 1 People who participated in this “national meeting” were apparently ideo-
logical conservatives. Participants declared in a resolution that “free democracy is being
shaken by irresponsible pro-North Korea leftists,” and urged the so-called “pro-North
Korea, anti-America leftists” to stop threatening the nation’s foundation and security in
the “guise of democratization and reforms.” 2 To the protesters, those who had a
forward-looking attitude toward North Korea were the “pro-North Korea leftists” who
needed to be eliminated. Interestingly, Protestant Christians led the gathering. Minis-
ters from the Christian Council of Korea (CCK) took part in the mass meeting in
droves, and many of the participants were Protestants whom they had urged to attend.
In other words, the CCK, which has represented Korea’s conservative Protestant
churches since its establishment in 1989, began to take an important role in a political
“counterattack” by the conservative camp. 3
It was around the end of the Kim Dae-Jung administration that Korea’s conservative
camp suddenly gathered together to act publicly against the government. Yet the con-
servative camp’s “counterattack” did not become serious until the Roh Moo-Hyun ad-
ministration took office. Over the course of a few months from late 2004, that is, about
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wing civil groups sprang up. This resulted from a cohesion of the right wing that
started during the Kim administration and was strengthened as the Roh government
came in. Unlike previous civic groups, the newly formed groups all made an issue of
the government’s “left-wing” ideology. They claimed that the “pro-North Korean leftist”
Roh administration was violating the legitimacy and the constitution of Korea, and
undermining its free-market economy. Conservative media agencies such as The Dong-
A Ilbo and The Chosun Ilbo began reporting on the sudden rise of these right-wing
civic groups. In early November of 2004, The Dong-A Ilbo called the groups the
“Korean ‘New Right’” in a feature article.4 From that moment, the right-wing civil
groups were commonly called the New Right. The New Right became increasingly ac-
tive over time. A number of new groups were formed, while the existing groups ex-
panded their organization by joining forces. In its September 2005 issue, Monthly
Chosun reported that “the Renaissance of the Right,” spearheaded by the emergence of
the New Right, paved “the ground for the revival of conservatism.”5
At first, Korea’s New Right movement was led by intellectuals, professionals, and
pundits. Then, after late 2005 when the theory and political alternatives of the move-
ment had largely been established, the movement was expanded as a popular campaign.
Conservative Protestants joined the New Right to become leaders of its popularization.
Conservatives had either conformed to or cooperated with previous authoritarian re-
gimes, appealing to the principle of the separation of church and state. Protestants who
joined the New Right movement, however, abandoned the old political conformism and
started to act against those in power. What then made the CCK, a religious group,
work with far-right ideological conservatives such as the Korean Veterans Association
and various other war veterans’ groups? This paper tries to explain why Protestant con-
servatives participated in the ideological “counterattack” by the political far right in the
2000s and examines some unique features of their worldview. In that regard, it investi-
gates the historical background of Protestant anti-communism, reasons that led Prot-
estant anti-communists to act, and characteristics of their anti-communism.History of anti-communism among Korean Protestants
The dictionary defines “conservatism” as cherishing something old, and keeping and
maintaining it as it is. In that sense, “conservatism” is the concept that most contradicts
“change.” Conservatives are generally repulsed by change. They believe that not all
change is progress and the test for anything is not whether it is progressive, but
whether it is right.6 If conservatism is defined as an attitude of keeping something
intact without making a change, or repulsion toward change, social and political
conservatism can be understood as resistance to social and political change. The Kim
Dae-Jung administration, which took office in 1998, was the first government since
independence formed by an opposition party after winning a presidential election. It
was in line with the Roh Moo-Hyun administration that followed it. The two govern-
ments pursued policies that were distinctively different from the previous anti-
communist, right-wing governments, thereby bringing about a number of “changes”
both in society and people’s minds. Some of the most representative changes included
democratization, diversification, and the dismantling of Cold War structures. A
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and reunification, recognition of diverse values, and a general reorientation toward a
non-authoritarian and equal society took place. Therefore, rejection of such progressive
socio-political changes can be viewed as social and political conservatism.
Social and political conservatives strove to keep what they were trying to conserve by
mounting a counterattack to changes made during the Kim and Roh administrations.7
It seems that some of the biggest changes that forced them to act were the weakening
of anti-communism in Korean society due to the progress of the post-Cold War era
and the spread of animosity toward the United States. These social changes threatened
conservatives’ essential values of anti-communism and pro-Americanism, and shook
their fundamental worldview. Therefore, they felt compelled to respond aggressively to
those changes. Considering that they had clung to anti-communism and pro-
Americanism, conservatives understandably had to respond to the post-Cold War
changes by making efforts to protect anti-communism and pro-Americanism.
This paper places its focus on the link between theological conservatism and socio-
political conservatism. The aforementioned “national meeting” held in the Seoul City
Hall Square seems to indicate that there is a rational and practical common ground be-
tween these two. More than anything else, what connected the two forces seems to
have been an ideological consensus on anti-communism. U.S. history tells us that
American Protestant conservatism has held an anti-communist attitude since its begin-
ning in the 1920 − 30s. Among American Protestant conservatives, however, those who
became the ideological far right and actively campaigned for anti-communism were
mostly fundamentalists.8 In Korea, too, there seemed to be a close relationship between
the “counterattack” by the Protestant rightists in the 2000s and theological
fundamentalism.
Historically, Korean Protestants’ anti-communism arose when it first collided with
the Marxism introduced to Korea in the 1920s. Protestants had to respond in some
way to the challenge from the Marxist-socialists who were promoting an anti-Christian
campaign as part of their anti-religious propaganda. A few Protestants who encoun-
tered Marxism became quite interested in the common people and even accepted so-
cialism. Yet most Korean Protestants were vehemently hostile toward Marxism. It
appears that two factors were at play here. One was western missionaries’ antipathy to
Marxism. Missionaries of the time were mostly from the Anglo-American middle clas-
ses and upheld the values of the capitalist market economy as the North American and
European middle classes did. Moreover, having grown up in the mainstream middle-
class churches, they shared the deeply rooted antipathy of the British and America
mainstream Protestants to atheism and materialism. When the missionaries were still
dominating Korea’s Protestant scene, their anti-communist sentiment must have had a
significant impact on Korean Protestants’ theology and their outlook on the world.
The other factor was Imperial Japan’s policy that brutally suppressed Marxism as a
threat to its regime and instilled anti-communism in the people.9 In the wake of the
First World War, Japan became the world’s third-largest military and economic power
and turned into a strong capitalist nation that pursued imperialistic expansion by
competing with Western powers. In particular, as it began invading Manchuria and
other regions of the Asian Continent in the 1930s, Japan became a Fascist nation
governed by extreme right-wing nationalists. Furthermore, since the mid-1920s,
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frequently arise in Korea.10 Marxist activists led countless peasant movements such as
in the Amtae Island Tenancy Dispute (1923–24) and workers’ disputes like the Wonsan
General Strike (1929). In response, Japan adopted tough anti-communist policy measures
in Korea and urged each church to cooperate.
In some ways, Japanese colonial rulers and missionaries were in conflict, but they
were also in a symbiotic relationship. Anti-communism was a common ground that
was in the interests of both parties. A case in point is the relationship of American
Presbyterian missionary George S. McCune and Governor-General Saito Makoto.11
McCune came to Korea in 1905, but had to give up his missionary work and return to
the United States because of his son’s illness. However, he came back to Korea as a
missionary in 1920. He did so because he was invited by Saito. After returning to the
States, McCune became the president of Huron College in South Dakota and actively
promoted an anti-communist campaign there. Saito heard of it and invited McCune
back to Korea believing that his experience and influence would be useful in the fight
against Marxist movements that were popular among nationalistic Koreans at the time.
McCune actively worked with policies of the Japanese Government-General of Korea
on anti-communism education while running the Boys Academy in Seoncheon, and
Soongsil Academy and Soongsil College in Pyongyang. Other missionaries were not differ-
ent from McCune and disliked Marxism. Their writings were replete with worries about
and polemics against Marxism and other radical ideas.12
Anti-communism, to which the vast majority of Korean Protestants held fast
throughout the period of Japanese occupation, was greatly intensified as Christians per-
sonally encountered Marxism after liberation and through the Korean War. Due to
Japan’s anti-communist policy, ordinary Korean Christians rarely had a chance to deal
with the leftists under Japanese colonial rule. Then, immediately after liberation,
Christians in the North collided with Marxists who were seizing the northern parts of
the Korean peninsula. Churches in the northern areas were predominantly composed
of capitalist middle-class, land-owning adherents, who used to conform to Japanese co-
lonialism. Hence, a conflict with communist North Korean authorities was inevitable.
The Presbyterian churches of Pyongyang and northwestern regions had a fundamental-
ist theology acquired from fundamentalist Presbyterian missionaries and were hostile to
Marxism. They were the mainstay of Korean Protestantism at that time. Some progres-
sive Protestant Christians embraced the establishment of a socialist regime. However,
the Marxist ideology threatened the socio-economic status of many Christians, forcing
them to carry out the “Exodus” to the capitalist South controlled by the U.S. military
government. The escape was motivated as much by ideological and socio-political rea-
sons as religious.13 However, Han Kyung-Jik and other Protestant leaders who fled
from North Korea justified their escape by making anti-communism a theological
cause. They declared that North Korea’s Marxist-socialist regime was an apocalyptic
anti-Christ.14
Meanwhile, South Korea saw an intense ideological conflict between the left and the
right. A vast majority of Protestants supported the establishment of a separate and in-
dependent government in South Korea led by Rhee Syngman and supported by the
United States. Rhee and South Korean Protestants were ideologically of one mind.
Some Protestant leaders including Kim Gu, Kim Gyu-Sik, and Kim Jae-Jun argued for a
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the conservative right. Some Christian socialists such as Kim Chang-Jun chose the
North and moved there. Ultimately, as the liberated nation went through political div-
ision, the church, too, split along ideological lines. Protestant defectors from the North
became leaders of South Korean churches.15 Their staunch anti-communist and pro-
American convictions made Protestantism a leading force of anti-communism and pro-
Americanism in South Korea. They treated the North Korean regime with hostility and
did not recognize pro-communist Christians in North Korea as Christian, believing that
the North Korean regime had eradicated Christianity.
While cooperating with the U.S. military government and Rhee Syngman, South
Korean Protestants enjoyed various benefits and preferential treatment.16 Church
leaders, under the influence of American missionaries and their experience of studying
in the United States, were pro-American. They regarded the United States as a model
for the new Korean republic after independence from Japanese rule. Both the conserva-
tive Han Kyung-Jik, who came to the South fleeing the socialist regime, and the liberal
Kim Jae-Jun, who dreamt of a unified government that would embrace socialism, were
pro-American. Rhee Syngman, the first President of the Republic of Korea, wanted to
make it “the first Christian nation in Asia.”17 His government, sustained by the support
from rightists and the United States, remained strongly anti-communist and pro-
American. Some church leaders made a connection between anti-communism and
apocalyptic theology. They stood in the forefront of anti-communism and the fight to
defeat communism. Arguing for a “northward reunification” even before the Korean
War, they opposed a ceasefire throughout the Korean War.18
The bloody Korean War left South Koreans and North Koreans with an insurmount-
able hatred of communism and the United States (and Christianity), respectively. The
division became permanent not just politically and ideologically, but also emotionally.
That was well demonstrated by Kim Jae-Jun who said after the war that a sympathetic
feeling toward communism was “delusional.”19 After the Korean War, Christians in
South Korea all became staunch anti-communists regardless of their theological stance.
The United States led the Korean War on the one hand while providing a massive relief
efforts through churches on the other.20 Consequently, it further strengthened pro-
Americanism among Korean Protestants, and anti-communism and pro-Americanism
came to be indivisible.
Due to the armistice, South Korea’s anti-communist Protestant leaders lost an oppor-
tunity for achieving reunification by force. When the war ended, they began attacking
and disrupting various attempts for a peaceful reunification, inter-Korean exchanges,
and reconciliation by stressing that they could not coexist with communism. As far
as anti-communism was concerned, the National Council of Churches in Korea
(NCCK) was no exception, even though the umbrella organ of relatively liberal
denominations led the democratization movement during the period of military
dictatorship. For instance, based on anti-communist spirit, the NCCK strongly
supported the Korean government’s decision to dispatch military forces to fight
against the Vietnamese communist-nationalists in the Vietnam War.21 Afterward, the
NCCK interrupted North Korean Christians’ efforts to make exchanges with the World
Council of Churches and Korean Christians overseas.22 These cases indicate that
anti-communism took deep root among South Korean Protestants regardless of
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dictatorship, including Kim Jae-Jun, Mun Ik-Hwan, and Jang Jun-Ha, were basically
anti-communists, as well. Minjung Theology, the Korean version of the progressive
praxis theology that strongly encouraged Christian social engagement, distanced
itself from Marxism.23
A forward-looking attitude toward North Korea first appeared among South Korean
Protestants in the aftermath of the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980. The
movement opened a crack in South Korean Protestants’ uniform anti-communism.
Awareness that some of the most significant socio-political issues in Korea fundamen-
tally arose out of the national division increased among progressive Protestants. Natur-
ally, opposition to the United States, a major power that created and maintained the
divided system, began to surface. A protest for democratization was converted into a
protest for reunification, which inevitably generated a conflict with anti-communism
and pro-Americanism. Conservative Protestant churches, which remained silent
throughout the military dictatorship, did not take part in a reassessment of the United
States and a shift toward post-Cold War society that was gaining steam after the
Gwangju Democratization Movement. They were still accustomed to the framework of
the Cold War and upheld the pro-American and anti-communist values that supported
it. From the end of the Korean War until the 2000s, they rarely took to the streets vol-
untarily for political purposes. What, then, made some members of conservative
churches gather in front of the city hall, wave the Stars and Stripes, and express their
hostility toward the so-called pro-North Korean leftists by singing “Up and Fight
against the Devil”?“Power vacuum” and the political activism of conservative Protestants
Conservative Protestants’ political activism materializes when certain external factors
coincide with one another. For starters, there needs to be a situation that seriously
threatens the conservatives’ worldview. A case in point is conservative Protestant
churches in the United States. They grew by adapting to capitalist pecking orders, and
the adherents were obedient to authorities. This disposition, combined with conserva-
tive Protestantism’s unique theological tendency to reduce all matters to personal is-
sues, led to indifference to or silence on socio-political issues. Yet, as they witnessed
their society gradually proceeding in a way they did not want, they came to realize the
disoriented society could shake the foundation of their values. That is when conserva-
tives became determined to “change” society.24 For their part, it was not the ones who
were protecting what is right who should change but the world that was moving in a
“wrong” direction.25
However, conservative Protestants who are used to complying with the socio-
economic status quo and the authorities do not try to jump into real politics only be-
cause they feel social changes could put their theological worldview at risk. They need
charismatic leaders who keep them motivated and incite them to action. It is known
that popular leaders of conservative churches tend to feel changes in socio-political
power very sensitively. A study found that when American fundamentalist leaders sense
a certain “power vacuum,” they get interested in filling it.26 In the 1970s, a Christian
right-wing movement arose in the United States, and conservative Protestants became
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crisis and a power vacuum, met. Supreme Court rulings such as a ban on group prayer
in public schools (1961) and the legalization of abortion (1973) gave conservative
Protestants a sense of crisis that secular liberalism was shaking the ethical foundations
of the United States. In addition, various changes brought by modernity, which most
Americans considered the wave of the future, were leading to a sharp increase in
divorces, a prevalence of pornography, and a rise in drug and alcohol addiction. Hence,
the morality of modernity became undermined, creating a “power vacuum.” Right-wing
Christian leaders utilized this as an opportunity to bring conservative Protestants
together and created political movements.
This also explains why some conservative Korean Protestant churches joined hands
with politically extreme rightists and clamored for anti-communism and pro-
Americanism when Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun were presidents. Liberal Protes-
tants, who actively participated in democratization protests from the 1970s to the
1980s, had enjoyed a sort of moral monopoly regarding social engagement. Conserva-
tive churches, which remained silent during the period of protests, found themselves in
an embarrassing position where they could find no theological excuse to justify the
silence. Some conservative Protestants began engaging in social activism after the late
1980s both as a result of self-questioning of past behavior and as a reaction to the
moral dominance of their progressive brethren. As Korea entered the period of
democratization in the wake of the “June Democracy Movement” of 1987, revolutionary
struggles dominated by progressives came to an end, and the so-called “period of
reformism” by civil movements arrived. Socially active conservative Protestants joined
civil movements in the 1990s.27 The expansion of reformist civil movements led to a
dramatic collapse of liberals’ moral superiority; it also helped create two of the most
progressive governments since the liberation from Japanese occupation.
The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea reflected
the post-Cold War trend around the world. It accompanied an ongoing attempt to
reassess the relationship with the United States since the Gwangju Democratization
Movement, and jeopardized anti-communism and pro-Americanism, the foundation of
Korean conservatives’ worldview. This development enraged the far rightists, and
some of them began to take one reactionary action after another. Nevertheless,
Protestant conservatives kept silent for the moment. Then, contrary to the wishes
of conservatives, the Kim administration was succeeded by the Roh administration.
Seeing a reform-oriented president again in the Blue House, they finally launched a
counterattack and generated great political turmoil, including an attempt to im-
peach President Roh Moo-Hyun in 2004.
It seems that this situation finally presented conservative Protestants, who had been
looking for an opportunity to move, with a “power vacuum.” The so-called reformists
who had taken power since the Kim administration failed to solidify shifts toward a
post-Cold War society, democratization, and diversification. On top of that, several
corruption scandals involving key figures from the two administrations broke out.
Although not comparable to crimes committed by the previous authoritarian regimes,
they seriously undermined the administrations’ morality by contradicting their own
pledges and the heightened expectations of the public. A reform-oriented party
took power, but conservatives were still wielding their power under the formidable
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a situation brought about a “power vacuum” where neither camp was strong enough to
hold dominant power.Anti-communism of conservative Protestants: nationism
Korea’s conservative Protestants felt a sense of crisis, that the emergence of the “left-
wing” Kim and Roh governments put their nation at risk, while they sensed a “power
vacuum” in Korean society. This situation encouraged them to start a political move-
ment. Their political activities were focused on actual or proposed threats to the foun-
dational principles of the Republic of Korea. The central value that conservative
Protestants tried to safeguard was Korea itself, the Korea that they believed to be an
anti-communist right-wing republic. Therefore, anti-communism and other relevant
values being undermined meant the national identity was in danger. In such a state of
crisis, Korea’s New Right groups were organized.
In November 2004, when New Right mass organizations had not yet been created,
the Christian Social Responsibility was formed to protect Korea out of an awareness
that Korea was in “the most difficult situation ever.”29 About a year later, the Korea
Christian Reform Movement joined Solidarity for Liberalism, the Textbook Forum, and
other rightist groups to establish the New Right Network, deploring the situation
whereby Korea “had lost its way and was thrown into confusion.”30 The New Right Na-
tional Alliance was similar to them in that it assessed the situation of Korea in a very
pessimistic tone. Its statement of establishment released in September 2005 deplored
that Korea was in an “overall crisis” and was undergoing a “conflict and confusion more
serious than that witnessed during the political situation immediately after liberation.”31
The Christian New Right Alliance, an affiliate of the New Right National Alliance,
lamented in its founding declaration of July 2007 that Korean society was trapped in a
“total crisis as if it had lost general guidance,” implying that Korea was in a perilous
situation in all sectors, including politics, economy, education, and culture.32 The con-
stitutional values were believed to be in great danger.
Amid gradually mounting counterattacks from the New Right on the “left-wing”
values of government and society, Protestant conservatives actively participating in
the movement with leadership and organizational power began to be called the
“Christian New Right.” From the perspective of the New Right, the left-wing gov-
ernment was undermining Korea’s basic values in every field. In particular, it was
concerned about a collapse of the laissez faire market economy. It blamed the left-
ist government for destroying Korea’s long-standing market economy by pursing
anti-market, anti-business, and anti-liberal policies based on its “hatred of
wealth.”33 In addition, it claimed that the leftists who did not trust the free market
also adopted measures to equalize education, legalize the Korean Teachers’ & Edu-
cational Workers’ Union, and to promote a labor-friendly environment during the
Kim and Roh administrations.34 Believing that such left-wing policies were hinder-
ing Korea from becoming an advanced country, the Christian New Right strove to
eliminate them and introduce market-friendly policy measures.
The Christian New Right thought that the leftists were doing massive harm to Korea’s
legitimacy and identity. It claimed that the leftists turned Korean history into “a history
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tory.”35 In order to recover the real Korea distorted by the leftist history, the Christian
New Right rewrote Korean history according to its own historical perspective and
worldview. To the Christian New Right, Korea was a right-wing republic established by
the right-wing founding fathers and developed by people promoting modernization,
and had a “history of success” until the leftist Kim and Roh administrations. Set up by
Rhee Syngman’s “realist choice” for a separate government in the South and through a
“process of democratic election,” the Republic of Korea was a nation without “any flaw
in legitimacy.” The Christian New Right believed that the national division and the
Korean War were entirely attributable to the Soviet Union and Kim Il-Sung. The
victims of “friendly fire” by Korean and American soldiers in action during the
Korean War were not comparable with the massacre of civilians by the North
Korean People’s Army. It also insisted that a rapid and successful modernization
and industrialization under the rule of Park Jung-Hee was possible only “on the
condition” of an authoritarian political system. Inequality in wealth, authoritarian
politics, and restrictions on and suppression of human rights were “inevitable side
effects and usual sacrifices” that any country around the world would experience
in the process of industrialization.36
The Christian New Right did not stop its efforts even after Lee Myung-Bak won a
presidential election with its support and took office in 2008. The Lee administration
claimed to advocate “pragmatism” and, therefore, did not wage a head-on war against
the leftists as expected. Hence, the Christian New Right argued that the liberals were
still conspiring to seize power even after the Lee administration was inaugurated. The
Christian Party leader Chun Gwang-Hoon, who failed to win a seat in the 18th general
elections held during the Roh administration, announced a party reshuffle and warned
that the leftists were trying to “infiltrate every corner of our society and destroy Korea
as a whole.”37 He declared that he would resume action to “save the country and
people.” In a similar vein, the Civil Action for Advancement group viewed the “anti-
Korean forces” that were “in a strong line-up” after the administration change as a
source of crisis.38 The group representative, Seo Gyung-Seok, listed specific names,
such as the Korean Teachers’ & Educational Workers’ Union, the Korean Confed-
eration of Trade Unions, the Korean Federation of Student Councils, and the National
Farmers League, as “pro-North Korean leftist forces.”39 He argued that hundreds of
thousands of leftists were “rocking the Republic of Korea and threatening free
democracy.”
Interestingly, Korean Protestant conservatives refer to “liberalism” in a very lim-
ited sense. What they mean by liberalism is confined to the free-market economy
with minimal government intervention and regulation; that is, liberalism to them
basically means an economic idea.40 Yet there are other values of liberalism in
politics, culture, and thought. A pivotal element of liberalism values individual free-
dom and rights and thereby strives to guarantee individuals an absolute freedom
whereby they can make a choice according to their conscience and lifestyle. Liber-
alism not only cherishes freedom of thought, religion, and art, but also tries to
minimize governmental intervention in such social issues as sex, abortion, gam-
bling, drinking, and addictive substances. The Korean New Right refers to free
democracy as an element of liberalism that it pursues. However, it apparently does
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Koreans” and “leftists.” The Korean New Right looks for liberalism in terms of the
economy, but in culture and thought, it seems to be surprisingly totalitarian.Anti-communism of Korean Protestants: dualism and Pro-Americanism
Conservative Protestants who began to engage in political activity, have a world outlook
that is based on a unique dualism. A scholar, who investigated why U.S. Protestant con-
servatives, historically characterized by political indifference and non-engagement, sud-
denly became anti-communist fighters during the Cold War era, found that they had a
>peculiar way of thinking. Christian anti-communist fighters in the United States, in-
cluding fundamentalist leader Carl McIntire who led a witch hunt for imagined com-
munists amid a frenzy of McCarthyism in the early 1950s, were strongly influenced by
a Manichean good-and-evil dualism.41 According to the Manichean view, the universe
is where the two equal forces, light (or good) and darkness (or evil), are fighting each
other, and history is a string of “conspiracies” created by evil to take over the world.42
With this perspective, conservative Protestants viewed history as a long battle between
God and Satan, that is, good and evil, and they strongly believed that they were always
on the side of good. This is why American conservative Protestants who began to act
politically thought that they were “moral” (or good), while the opposition was “political”
(or evil).43
American conservative Protestants’ belief in Manichean dualism was strengthened by
a realist epistemology based on Scottish Common-Sense Realism that many Anglo-
American Protestants shared. Common-Sense Realism taught that human cognition
was correct and human knowledge was reliable.44 In other words, common-sense
philosophers saw that all human beings could instinctively be assured of the objective
truths and principles of religious faiths without specific evidence. They called such
self-evident knowledge “common sense.” The philosophy exerted a profound influence
on American conservative theologians such as J. Gresham Machen, and became the
foundation of fundamentalist-evangelical theology.45 Manichean dualism caused a great
synergistic effect when it met with Common-Sense Philosophy. When people saw
something appear within a framework of two contradictory things (i.e., good and evil),
the epistemology of “common sense” allowed them to clearly understand to which side
it belonged. The dualistic worldview and the realist epistemology joined conservative
Protestants’ sense of urgency that they were lagging behind the mainstream of the
United States, and instilled in them a peculiar mentality of fundamentalist anti-
communist fighters.46
One can easily find Manichean dualism in today’s American Christian Right.
Christian Right theorists in the United States dichotomize the history of the West and
see it as a battle between good and evil. For instance, Francis Schaeffer, a fundamenta-
list theologian and the “official intellectual” of the Christian Right, viewed the his-
tory of the West as a process whereby humanism, originating from Greco-Roman
thought, had conflicted with the God-centered view led by Christianity.47 He
claimed that humanistic elements had degraded the “original” biblical truth of
Christianity, which had eventually brought about the Enlightenment, communism,
and secular humanism, destroying the ideas and lives of modern people through decadent
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tent, good, and one-and-only God, they also think that evil is strong enough to chal-
lenge God and take over the world. Therefore, their monotheism is confessional,
yet their dualism is empirical. Like Manichaeism, the supporters of the Christian
Right divide the world into good and evil and discern who belongs where without
hesitation. To them, everything on this planet is either good or evil, light or dark,
and true or untrue, and there is nothing in between. The God-centered belief, repre-
sented by the Bible, Christianity, and the United States, is a good and bright world, while
secular humanism, linked to reason, the mundane world, and “un-Americanism,” is an
evil and dark world.49
McIntire, Schaeffer, and other American fundamentalist leaders and theorists had a
direct impact on the way fundamentalism took root in Korea’s Protestant churches,
especially the Presbyterian Church, after the Korean War. From the beginning, the
hallmark of Korean Protestantism was theological and ethical conservatism.50 Never-
theless, it was not a monolithic phenomenon. For instance, leaders of the Seoul Station
of the American Northern Presbyterian Mission, who had a great influence on the
South before liberation, were theologically moderate missionaries. Their theological
beliefs were different from those of fundamentalist missionaries in Pyongyang to
the point that the two camps were in serious conflict regarding mission school
policies and Shinto shrine obeisance.51 However, the mainstream American Protestant
churches lost much of their passion for overseas missions after the Second World War.
They now had a better understanding of non-Christian cultures, and conservative
theology, which had mass-produced missionaries in the past, no longer dominated the
mainstream Protestant churches. As a result, the missionaries who came to Korea after
liberation were mostly those who still adhered to conservative theology or came from
fundamentalist denominations. After the Korean War, in particular, American funda-
mentalist leaders, represented by Carl McIntire, sent missionaries and money to Korea
to expand their influence. This triggered theological conflicts within the existing
churches, the resulting fragmentation enabling fundamentalists to establish new
churches.
The fundamentalist missionaries led to the creation of fundamentalist Protestant denom-
inations in Korea. Along with the fundamentalist Protestants from North Korea in mainline
denominations, who had fled to the South after the liberation and during the Korean War,
they formed a strong fundamentalist element in South Korean Protestantism. This new
alliance of Protestant fundamentalists became a dominant force in the South Korean
churches, and created a generally fundamentalist tendency among South Korean
Protestantism after the Korean War. The dualism of American fundamentalist the-
ology converged with strong anti-communism in Cold War Korea. Unlike American fun-
damentalist dualism, its unique Korean version was much more ideologically inclined due
to the experience of the Korean War and national division, and the concomitant domin-
ance of Cold-War culture in Korean society.
Korean Protestant fundamentalists were under the constant influence of American
fundamentalism through people-to-people exchanges and the introduction of theology.
The Korean Christian New Right Movement appeared in the same context. It is not dif-
ficult to find traces of conceptualized Manichean dualism in the words of the Korean
Christian New Right, which was directly affected by American fundamentalism. Yet,
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ren. The Christian New Right members called themselves “patriotic groups,” “advance-
ment-oriented forces,” and “patriotic rightists,” whereas they accused their opponents of
being “anti-Korean,” “anti-advancement forces,” and “pro-North Korean leftists.” The
Christian New Right in Korea included people with various political goals, ranging from
establishing a “theocratic state” to achieving “middle-line integration.” In their views of
the world, however, evil was a specific group dubbed the “left wing.” These leftists were
the source of all political and social evil as well as the main culprit that was pushing
Korea into a crisis.
When compared to the Christian Right in the United States, the Korean Christian
New Right believes in a dualism whereby evil more clearly takes the form of left-wing
ideology. This aspect is well demonstrated by remarks made by pastors and church
members who attended a fasting prayer meeting held in a church before the aforemen-
tioned “national meeting” took place in the Seoul City Hall Square. A pastor declared,
in his sermon, that “Communism is the No. 1 enemy of Christians,” and it was “the
Satan and Antichrist of the 21st century.” Then, an elder brought up a conspiracy the-
ory in a special lecture that Korea was under “the control of the Red Devil” during the
2002 World Cup. The theory explained that on the red T-shirts that Koreans wore to
cheer for the national team was the phrase “Be the Reds,” and the red “commies,” in-
vited at that time, were disturbing the entire country.52
When looking closely, one can discover that the concerns of the Korean Christian
New Right are mostly concentrated on political and economic issues. Unlike the
Christian rightists of the United States, the Christian New Right in Korea rarely ex-
presses its official stance on social or moral issues. Even on corruption and immorality
its discussions are always within the scope of politics and the economy. In other words,
it rarely touches upon social and ethical topics that its American counterparts are
greatly concerned about, such as abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, stem cell re-
search, and pornography. This is certainly because Korea’s Christian New Right was
born of ideological crises arising from a Cold-War mentality endemic for decades, and
its interest is centered on ideological issues.
One of the most interesting remarks made during the prayer service above was
that the United States was playing a leading role in a fight against communism
(and Satan). The elder mentioned above insisted that the U.S. outlook was in line
with that of Christianity, and, therefore, opposing such a country was “betrayal”
and “ingratitude.” He added that the division on the Korean peninsula was not a
disaster, but a blessing, and God wanted Korea to become a “suitable helper” for
the United States, the leader of world history. According to the Book of Genesis,
God created a woman as a “suitable helper” to a man. By using the words from
Genesis, the elder tried to place the United States in a superior position to Korea,
and simultaneously tried to describe the Korea-U.S. partnership as a relationship as
close as that of a married couple. Finally, by saying that Satan was most afraid of
the Korea-U.S. alliance and hence promoted anti-Americanism, the elder attached
an apocalyptic meaning to the Korea-U.S. alliance and anti-American sentiment. At
the end of the meeting, a pastor called for a prayer for the United States, the na-
tion God had posted as a “sentry” for anti-communism.53 When the service was
over, the attendees headed in droves for the city hall square.
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forefront of a battle against communism during the Cold War, believed that commu-
nists were constructing a “plot” to rule the United States. They thought that such com-
munism was the anti-Christ that would appear during the apocalypse, and that the
United States, a country that God had chosen to save the world, had a responsibility to
devote itself to a fight against communism.54 Many of the Korean conservative Protest-
ant leaders believed in the similar providential mission of rescuing the world. In the
course of the formation of Korean Protestant anti-communism, a sort of providential
elitism whereby Korea was destined to be an assistant to the United States was com-
bined with anti-communism, good-and-evil dualism, and America-centered eschat-
ology. 55 To the Korean Protestant anti-communists, the United Sates is leading a holy
war against evil communism, and Korea is an ally. Consequently, according to their
dualistic worldview, anti-Americanism is synonymous with a pro-North Korean atti-
tude, and anything that hurts the Korea-U.S. alliance is a consequence of siding with
North Korea and goes against the national interests of Korea.
Conclusion
One of the most important clues that help one understand conservative Protestants’
anti-communism is Manichean dualism. The dualistic world outlook makes one view
the world in an extremely simplified way. According to it, the world consists of good
and evil only. It is not concerned about the fact that there is a great distance between
what people do and what they intend, what people say and what they mean, and what
is imagined and what is real. Manichean dualistic worldview is like a weapon necessary
for an urgent battle, rather than a helpful instrument to understand the world in a care-
ful manner. Its dualism, combined with Common-Sense Realism, lets its adherents
clearly separate friends from foes and easily discern good and evil. As such, Manichean
dualism is a highly effective tool for Protestant anti-communists to enlist friendly forces
and expand the war front in an ideologically hypersensitive Korean social setting where
words like “communism” or “leftist” can instantly arouse animosity in many people.
This explains why Korean conservative Protestants, who waged a war against the “pro-
North Korea leftists,” were in a desperate sense of crisis, why they were so infuriated
with their enemies, and why they were so resolute in battle.
However, such a theological and worldview-related reason cannot fully explain the
political activism of Protestant conservatives. Just like the evangelical-fundamentalist
churches of the United States, Korea’s conservative Protestants have obeyed political
authorities and have optimized themselves for the capitalistic market economy. Hence,
their political actions should be closely linked to political and economic factors. This is
where the “power vacuum” comes in. Korea during the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-
Hyun administrations was in a strange situation in which both the progressives and
conservatives felt they were under attack and were in danger. The progressives failed to
come out of the victim mentality they had felt since the period of military dictatorship
even after they took power, while the conservatives felt their long-held capitalist values
and Cold War structures being shaken and their vested rights being attacked as pro-
gressive governments took office. This kind of mutual victim mentality probably arose
from a “power vacuum” during the transitional period where neither camp held actual
dominance. The anger and the sense of crisis felt by Protestant conservatives also came
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obedient to those in powers, their political activities in the early 2000s were probably
attributable to the “power vacuum.”
With the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration, Korea returned to the
old anti-communist tradition. For the first few years of the Lee administration, there
were many worried voices about the “pro-North Korea leftists” who still remained in
the Republic of Korea. Yet the Lee administration was succeeded by the Park Geun-
Hye administration, a much more ideologically conservative regime. The launching of
conservative policies by the Park administration, which were strongly reminiscent of
anti-communist policies before the progressive administrations, means that the afore-
mentioned power vacuum has been filled at least in terms of politics. Under an anti-
communist government, Protestant conservatives would rarely feel a sense of urgency
as they did under the Kim and Roh administrations, and hence would not take action
as they did at that time. After all, what they are trying to achieve will be done by the
Park government. They only need to do their part by occasionally attacking the sus-
pects that the government had better not deal with. Their campaign against the WCC
General Assembly held in Busan, Korea in 2013 was one such incident. Conservative
Protestants insisted that the WCC was a pro-communist organ and should not be
allowed to hold a meeting in Korea.
In the future, as before, Protestant conservatives’ anti-communist sentiment will be
sustained by the division on the Korean Peninsula. In North Korea, Kim Jong-Un inher-
ited the regime from his father Kim Jong-Il. While one does not know what kind of
changes the younger Kim will pursue in the future, what is certain is that he will never
give up the socialism that the North Korean rulers have adhered to since his grand-
father Kim Il-Sung. With the coming of the Park administration, ideological tensions
between the South and the North have been considerably heightened. The Cold-War
structure in South Korea, resulting from the national division and weakened during the
Kim and Roh administrations, has become solidified again. Unless this structure is at
risk, that is, unless South Korea’s capitalist and anti-communist system and values are
shaken and another “power vacuum” is created, Protestant conservatives would find it
difficult to find the courage or momentum to turn themselves toward political activism
again.
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